THE LIMITS OF CHILDHOOD:
CONCEPTIONS OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
ARLENE SKOLNICK*

Neither Youth nor Childhood is Folly or Incapacity. Some Children are
Fools and So are some Old Men.
-William Blake
INTRODUCTION

Policies and decisions concerning children ultimately derive from conceptions of childhood. Those who make such decisions must premise their
choices on ideas about children's needs and capacities, how these change
with age, what circumstances are good or bad for growing children, and
some notion of where to draw the line between childhood and adulthood.
These beliefs are not usually stated explicitly; most often they are tacitly assumed; Kalven has observed that legal systems sometimes are based on
"premises so mundane and commonplace as not to need any systematic confirmation."1
Contemporary American society shares a particular conception of childhood. Spanning the years from birth to the late teens, childhood is assumed
to be a distinct era of life, having its own psychology and special needs and
requiring special institutions. Although childhood is subdivided into different age-linked stages, the distinguishing feature of all of childhood is incompetence. The legal system not only reflects and codifies this conception
of childhood, but shapes the social reality in which children-and adultslive their daily lives. It presumes that children are "incomplete beings who
are not fully competent to determine and safeguard their interests. ' 2 Thus
legal restrictions prevent persons below certain ages from engaging in
various activities-voting, working full time, driving, buying liquor, entering into contracts, marrying. Other laws require persons between the ages
of six and sixteen years or thereabouts to attend school and to remain under
the supervision and control of parents until reaching majority.
The other major formal codification of concepts of childhood, apart
from the law, is found in the literature of developmental psychology. Although there are many fundamental similarities between legal and psycho* Consultant, Childhood and Government Project, and Research Psychologist, Institute of
Human Development, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Quoted in Rosenheim, The Child and the Law, in 3 CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH [CHILD
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY] 509 (B. Caldwell & H. Ricciuti eds. 1973).
2. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3 (1974).
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logical concepts of childhood, there is little direct influence of one field on
the other. Rather, the resemblances may be attributed to the fact that both
fields reflect the assumptions of the larger society. The relative lack of contact between law and psychology has often been deplored. It is argued,
particularly by developmental psychologists and reform-minded policymakers, that public policies should be more directly based on scientific
knowledge of child development. Developmental psychology, in this view, is
assumed to contain clear policy mandates waiting to be put into effect.
There are, however, a number of difficulties with the assumption that
social sciences contain guidelines for policy-makers. This article will argue
that rather than being obvious or given, the policy implications of much
research, including that on children, is problematic. To begin at the simplest
level, the kinds of problems studied by social scientists may bear little relevance to the issues involved in policy decisions. Bronfenbrenner, a developmental psychologist, has, for example, recently written of his inability to
answer many of the questions he was asked in his capacity as an expert witness.' The questions dealt with such matters as the effects of half-day versus
full-day group care, age-desegregated classrooms, etc. Bronfenbrenner
could not answer these questions because they concern the impact on children of the enduring environments in which they live or might live. Such
issues have been relatively neglected by researchers in favor of laboratory
studies: As Bronfenbrenner sums it up: "[M]uch of American developmental
psychology is the science of the behavior of children in strange situations with strange
4
adults."

Even where researchers have investigated the effects of enduring environments, however, the results are by no means unequivocal. Unlike the
chemist's or physicist's findings, the social scientist's facts are often contextdependent-that is, they may be accurate in one situation or for one group
of people, but not another. Many times in the history of child development
research, seemingly well-established research findings or theoretical notions
have had to be revised and even rejected in the light of further study. Such
issues as the effects of early separation from the mother, 5 traumatic experiences, 6 different methods of weaning and toilet-training, 7 working mothers.8
3.
45
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and fatherless families9 have turned out to be more complex than had originally been thought. Predicted effects have turned out to be nonexistent,
limited to certain conditions, or in a direction opposite to what was expected.
For example: 10
Until rather recently, research projects and professional conferences were
discussing the adverse effects on children of having a mother work outside the home. Distressed mothers, alarmed by the publicising of an inadequately controlled research study, were writing to the Children's Bureau
to ask, "Am I making my child into a juvenile delinquent because I have
to work?"
Today there is remarkable consensus among research investigators that
the mother's outside employment is not in itself the crucial variable ....
All of this is not to state that developmental research cannot be valid or
useful or that there is never enough evidence to support a firm and generalizable conclusion. An example of such a well-established finding concerns
the psychological attachment of infants and children to their principal caretakers. It is important for judges and policy-makers to know that the removal
of a child from its "psychological" parents-whether they are, in fact, biological, adoptive, or foster parents-may have a severe emotional impact on
the child." More often, however, there is a tension between the tentativeness with which scientific findings should be regarded and the needs of
policy-makers for clear-cut principles upon which to base decisions.
Another set of problems arises out of the influence of social contexts on
not only the people who are to be explained but the people who are doing
the explaining. Allport, among others, has observed that social psychological theories are not "chaste scientific productions," but rather reflect
the prevailing political and social atmosphere. 2 In a changing and pluralistic
society such as ours, there is much less consensus among social scientists as
to the nature of social reality than there is among natural scientists about
nature. There are as many different definitions of mental health, for example, as there are notions about what is the good life. In the field of child
study, the same basic issues that have divided scholars for centuries continue
to remain unresolved: is the child a savage whose unruly impulses must be
tamed before he is fit for society? Or is socialization a warping of the child's
innate capacities? Who or what is responsible for how the child turns outhis parents, circumstances, heredity, or the child himself?.
& F. NYE, THE EMPLOYED MOTHER AND THE FAMILY (1974); Siegal & Hass, The Working Mother:
A Review of Research, 39 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 513 (1963).
9. See Herzog & Sudia, Children in Fatherless Families, in 3 CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
[CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY] 141 (B. Caldwell & H. Ricciuti eds. 1973).
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Both developmental psychology and the legal system reflect the prevailing political and social atmosphere concerning children. Perhaps the chief
feature of our society's attitudes towards children is a profound ambivalence.
There is, on the one hand, a rhetoric of concern for children-as indicated
by the popular belief that America is a child-centered society and the
twentieth century is the century of the child. Foreign observers and anthropologists have seen our preoccupation with children as a national trait. In
the legal system, the rhetoric of concern is explicitly stated in the use of "the
best interests of the child" as a guide for decision making. Although most
developmental psychologists regard themselves as scientists rather than
policy-makers or child welfare workers, the prevailing assumption seems to
be that research on children is, by definition, in the best interests of the
3

child.1

Yet, on the other hand, there also is evidence of a "vast neglect" of children, as the Report of the 1970 White House Conference on Children put
14
it.
Such evidence may be found in statistics concerning infant mortality
and the number of children in poverty. Further, the rhetoric about childcenteredness obscures the reality of childhood as a dependent and subordinate status. In a recent review of the legal status of children, Rodham notes
that there is an ideology of dependency that justifies denying children certain rights.' 5 The dependency rationale assumes that certain individuals
are unable or undeserving of the right to look after themselves and, therefore, need special social institutions to protect them. Further, the dependency
rationale presumes that the society is doing its best for the dependent individual. Rodham notes other examples of this phenomenon: 6

Along with the family, past and present examples of such arrangements
include marriage, slavery, and the Indian reservation system. The relative
powerlessness of children makes them uniquely vulnerable to this rationale
... . Obviously this dependency can be explained to a significant degree
by the physical, intellectual, and psychological incapacities of (some) children which render them weaker than (some) order persons. But the phenomenon must also be seen as part of the organization and ideology of the
political system itself.
Developmental psychology shares this ambivalent approach to children.
On the one hand, psychology has contributed enormously to what Fromm
has called "the revolution of the child."' 7 Before the nineteenth century,
13. See, e.g., 3 CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH [CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICN]
vii(B. Caldwell & H. Ricciuti eds. 1973): "Our pattern has been to place our data into the public
pool of knowledge and trust that the implications will be recognized and then put to work in
practical situations concerned with guiding the development of the child and with shaping
environnents in which that development will occur."
14. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 10 (1970).
15. See Rodhaln, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 487 (1973).
16. Id. at 493.
17. E. FROMM, THE CRISIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 56 (1970).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 39: No. 3

the infant and the very young child were thought to be incapable of thought,
feeling, or suffering. Nor was it known that the experiences of infancy could
influence later development: heredity or fate was generally held responsible
for how a person turned out. Freud was the most influential of a number of
nineteenth century theorists and reformers who, articulated a new view of
the child. He argued that rather than being blank and insensitive organisms,
the very young were passionate beings, with powerful emotions and complicated thought processes1

8

Freud's general view of the child as a sensitive individual with an active
mental life has been confirmed and even extended. Recent psychological
research has been studying the earliest weeks and months of life and finding
that infants can make fine perceptual discriminations, shape the behavior of
their caretakers, and very soon form strong attachments to them. 19
Yet, on the other hand, psychological research and theory has also played
a role in promoting the rationale of children's incompetence and dependency. Writing specifically about adolescence, the psychologist Bakan finds
that the elaboration of theories and research on the special psychology of
that age has had two contrasting effects. One has been to draw attention to
an important period in the lives of contemporary individuals, thus prompting public concern for adolescent needs. But at the same time, psychology
has stressed the pathology of adolescence, thus depreciating the value and
2
status of adolescents as persons:

By stressing, for example, the presumptive emotional instability and tinformed nature of people of that age ...Hall and others tended to put a
gloss of psychopathology on this age period. Since it has long been a principle in our society that persons regarded as psychologically pathological
are to be relieved of rights, the effect of this literature has been to serve
the general disability of persons under legal ages. In this way, the workers
in the field of adolescence have tended to conspire, certainly unwittingly,
with some of the forces depriving adolescents of their rights.
Much of the apparent inconsistency between these effects can be resolved
by emphasizing that Fromm's "revolution of the child" pertains largely to
the earliest stages of childhood, while Bakan is writing of the oldest age.
Obviously, infancy is the state of life in which both the legal rationale
of dependency and developmental notions of incompetence are most ap-

propriate. The question is, at what age does the extension of dependency
and incompetence concepts to older children become inappropriate? Both
law and psychology may place the line at an unjustifiably late point in the

child's life. Although psychology distinguishes among infancy, childhood,
18.
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and adolescence, it emphasizes the contrast between these ages and adulthood. Similarly, Rodham notes that the law's placement of the dividing line
between legal minority and adult status at the age of eighteen or twenty-one
years is "artificial and simplistic" because it obscures the dramatic differences among children of different ages and the striking similarities between
older children and adults.2 That observation seems so sound and obvious
that it raises the question of how such differences-and also the resemblance
between older children and adults-have come to be obscured?
The purpose of this article is to question those taken-for-granted and
often unstated assumptions about children that influence both research and
policy-making. First, it questions the assumption of childhood incompetence
by challenging the rationality of linking childhood and adolescence to infancy and failing to draw sharper distinctions between early and later ages
of children. Second, it questions the notion that the course of child development as we observe it-and the familiar division of the life cycle into stages
of infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adulthood-represents a "natural"
or biologically-based process inherent in the human condition, rather than
one shaped by social and cultural influences. Finally, it questions whether a
society's sensitivity to age differences, concern for the special and distinctive nature of childhood, and separation of children from adult concerns
and company necessarily imply advantages in child welfare and social status.
To explore these issues, this article will pursue two themes: First, it will
examine the social and cultural changes that historically have influenced
children themselves as well as ideas about children. Second, it will look at the
intellectual traditions within developmental psychology as an influence on
conceptions of childhood.

IMAGES OF CHILDHOOD

The biological facts of development are universal and obvious. We are
born small, helpless, and ignorant; with age, we grow larger, stronger and
more competent. We all pass through puberty, with its dramatic changes in
appearance and physiology. If we live long enough, we may become weaker
and less competent. The same final state awaits us all.
Beyond these biological inevitabilities, however, there is much room for
variation. Although age differences, like the differences between the sexes,
are universally recognized and used to categorize people socially, the facts
of nature are "doctored," as Benedict has put it, in different ways by different cultures. 22 No one of the particular patterns of development can be
21.
22.

See Rodham, supra note 15, at 489.
Benedict, Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning, 1 PSYCHIATRY 161 (1938).
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regarded as the "natural" path to maturity. In other societies and in past
eras of Western culture, the life cycle has been punctuated into stages different from the ones we now recognize. There have been great variations in
conceptions of children's needs, capacities, and dynamics of growth. And
there have been striking differences in the amount of attention devoted to
children and their development.
In trying to understand conceptions of and attitudes towards childhood,
it is necessary to distinguish among at least three different sources of such
conceptions. First, there is the cultural ideology that prevails in a given place
or time pertaining to children. Second, there are the attitudes concerning
the child as the object of parental affection and concern. And finally, there
is the child as the object of scientific study. It is impossible to understand
the last without some awareness of the cultural and parental meanings of
childhood.
A.

The Child as Cultural Symbol

Throughout Western history, the child has symbolized both good and
evil. The child has represented, as well as innocence, the impulsive side of
human nature and subordination to authority. Attitudes towards childhood
have varied depending on whether impulse and authority were viewed
positively or negatively. Often the two attitudes have coexisted-the ambivalence towards children noted above for contemporary American society
reaches back several centuries. In his history of child study, Kessen observes
that particularly in England and America, there has been a -... curious conflict between childhood as innocence and the grim portrait of an evil being
who inust be scourged to his salvation ... "23
The contradiction may have been most pronounced during the Victorian
era. In a stidy of the child in literature and society in nineteenth-century
England, Coveney observes that a sentimental emphasis on childhood innocence coexisted with a "savagery towards children in practice 24-namely,
the exploitation of children in industry and severe child rearing practices
favored by the Victorian family.
Calvinist theory, which influenced many Protestant sects, had as a prime
tenet of child rearing the doctrine of "infant depravity," which held that
the infant was doomed to sin and evil unless controlled by parents. In a review of early nineteenth-century American literature on child rearing, Sunley writes: ' Submission was obtained by "breaking the will" of the child-a concept
not restricted, however, to those actually members of Calvinist religious
23. W. KESSEN, THE CHILD 33 (1965).
24. P. COVENEr, THE IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD 302 (1967).
25. Stmley, Earl Nineteenth-Century American Literature on Childrearing,
CON EIMPORARY CULTURES 150, 159 (M. Mead & N. Wolfenstein eds. 1955).
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groups. "Will" was seen as any defiance of the parents' wishes at any age.
"The very infant in your arms will sometimes redden and strike, and throw
back its head, and stiffen its little rebellious will." . .. The techniques to be
used for breaking the will were widely discussed ....
The doctrine of infant depravity was one aspect of the extreme asceticism and antisensuousness of early Protestantism. Towards the close of the
eighteenth century, however, the theme of childhood innocence was forcefully asserted by Rousseau and the romantic school of writers, most notably
Blake, Wordsworth, and Dickens. Rousseau's views of childhood were revolutionary in several respects. 26 He argued that childhood was important
and natural in itself. Rather than treat the child as a small adult, to be trained
out of its childish ways into adult morality and reason, Rousseau argued
that ". . . nature wants children to be children before they are men.... Childhood has ways of seeing, thinking, and feeling peculiar to itself; nothing can
be more foolish than to substitute our ways for them. ' 27 In contrast to the
doctrine that the child was innately depraved and needed vigilant adult
guidance to develop properly, Rousseau argued that the child would develop naturally towards virtue with a minimum of adult training.
Besides being opposed to the original-sin view of childhood, Rousseau's
notions of development also were at odds with the empirical philosophers
such as Locke and Hume, who argued that the child's mind was a tabula
rasa-a blank slate to be filled in by experience and education. 28 These
philosophical views of children are the direct ancestors of views prevailing
today. Thus, Rousseau is the ancestor of certain schools of contemporary
developmental psychology, as well as of much of "progressive" education,
while the tabula rasa point of view is maintained by the behaviorists, who
argue that growth is shaped by the push and pull of environmental forces.
The Calvinist view also still persists in something close to its original version
in large segments of the population.
There are also many parallels between the Calvinist idea of infant depravity and the Freudian concept of the id as a seething cauldron of lustful
and murderous impulses. Like the Calvinists, Freud emphasized the role of
parents as tamers of the child's animal nature and agents of civilization. 2"
The modern demonic view of the child has been forcefully represented in
such literary works as Golding's The Lord of the Flies, a work that not only
attained wide popularity, but sometimes is cited by psychologists as a valid
representation of the nature of childhood.
The psychoanalytic view, however, differs from religious conceptions
26.
27.

J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE (B. Foxley transl. 1911).
Quoted in P. COVENEY, supra note 24, at 44.

28.
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of sin in many important ways. The Freudian message about the child also
contained a plea for the recognition and protection of the special qualities
of childhood and of the naturalness of development, largely echoing Rousseau. As Coveney comments: "For all his destruction of the idea of childhood's innocence, Freud's ideas were in fact in fundamental sympathy with
the original romantic assertion of childhood's importance, and its vulnera30
bility to social victimization.
Before concluding this discussion of varying cultural conceptions of
childhood, it should be noted that the practical and policy implications of
each view are more complex than they might seem at first glance. For example, although Calvinist views could be and often were used to justify brutal
child rearing methods, some have argued that such views signified an increase in the status of children in society as a whole and in the family-that
concern for the child's soul symbolized increasing concern for the child as a
person and a greater degree of emotional involvement between parents and
31
children.
There is also another side to the Rousseauian celebration of childhood.
Rousseau's assertions of the natural childishness of the child emphasized
the distance between children and adults-the childishness of the child was
the complement of the supremacy of the adult. Rousseau's work is full of
pleas for parental authority over the child, although this authority should be
presented as natural, not arbitrary. "Reason" was to be used only among
32
adults, "force" was to be employed in dealing with children:
Treat your scholar according to his age. Put him in his place from the
first and keep him in it .... Give him no orders at all, absolutely none. Do
not even let him think that you claim any authority over him. Let him only
know that he is weak and you are strong, that his condition and yours puts
him at your mercy; let this be perceived, learned, and felt.
Although later developmental theories do not assert the need for adult
supremacy-they are descriptive, not prescriptive-the emphasis on the
childishness of the child continues to carry the same message. Some historians
have questioned whether a high degree of sensitivity to the various stages
of childhood and youth really is evidence of concern with the child's welfare.
Rothman, for example, has pointed out that there is a "darker side" of agegrading-age-grading may reflect one form of social control over children,
"part of an effort to lock-step the child into rigid and predetermined modes
of behavior. ' 33 Thus, a sensitivity to age differences may reflect an attempt
on the part of those charged with the management of children to make their
P. COVENEY, supra note 24, at 301.
MORGAN, TFHE PURITAN FAMILY (1944).
32. J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE 55 (B. Foxley transl. 1911).
33. Rothman, Documents in Search of a Historian: Toward a History of Childhood and Youth in
America, 2 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 367, 377 (1971).
30.

31.

See, e.g., F.
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tasks easier-a "rationalization of childhood" in the interests of making the
child's behavior more predictable and manageable. Speaking of the schools,
colleges, orphan asylums, and other institutions for the socialization of the
34
young that grew up in the nineteenth century, Rothman writes:
The spread of common schools, the erection of houses of refuge, the
multiplication of orphan asylums, and the nature of college training did
not necessarily indicate improvements and reforms. The coercive elements
in the pre-Civil War common schools, both in practice and in concept, are
so obvious that it is a testimony to the strength of democratic ideology
that historians could ignore them for so long. An element of social control
runs through almost everything that Horace Mann wrote. The houses of
refuge and orphan asylums were an overt attempt to infantilize the young,
to put delinquents, vagrants, and the homeless into a rigid and disciplined
environment where they would acquire the obedience that their parents

had failed to inculcate. Behind these institutions was the assumption that
any manifestation of public disorder in the young was evidence of future
depravity.
Within the family as well, it can be questioned whether a concern with
child rearing is an index of pure concern with the child's welfare. "Enlightened" child rearing, like that advocated by Rousseau, may reflect not so
much a decline in parental authority as a "shift in tactics from coercion to
manipulation.13 5 Sunley suggests that the emergence of interest in the child
and problems of child rearing may have reflected a new emphasis on the
child as the agent of parental ambitions, and as a representative of the parent's status in society.

3 6

B.

Parental Conceptions of Children

Despite some resemblances, the child of the philosophers and the theologians is not the same as the child in the eyes of parents. The relationship
between ideologies of childhood and parental attitudes or behavior is complex. Indeed, in some instances expert recommendations ran directly counter
to actual practice. Thus, Kessen points out that despite 2000 years of exhortation by philosophers and physicians "the most persistent single note
37
in the history of the child is the reluctance of mothers to suckle their babies.
Parental responses to children are influenced by other factors besides
authoritative advice. Demographic and economic realities are often more
powerful forces. The chief fact concerning children until quite recently in
Western history is that most of them would die before growing up. As late as
1750, for example, the odds were three-to-one against a London child sur34. Id. at 376.
35. Id.
36. See Sunley, supra note 25, at 151. See also Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View
of the Legal Conception of Growing Up and Letting Go, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 3, at 78 (1975).
37. W. KESSEN, supra note 23, at 1.
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viving until its fifth birthday .3 The dramatic reduction of infant mortality
brought about by medical advances in the past two centuries is widely credited
with revolutionizing the attitudes of parents to young children and infants.
When infant mortality rates were high in Europe, parents tended to become only minimally attached to their infants, and the death of an infant
was not an occasion for deep or prolonged grief. The historical literature
contains many statements from preindustrial Europe that sound unbe39
lievably callous to modern ears:
As late as the seventeenth century, in Le Caquet de l'accouchee, we have a
neighbour, standing at the bedside of a woman who has just given birth,
the mother of five "little brats," and calming her fears with these words:
"Before they are old enough to bother you, you will have lost half of them,
or perhaps all of them." . . . People could not allow themselves to become

too attached to something that was regarded as a probable loss.
Premodern Europeans saw infants as existing in a sort of limbo between
life and death, more animal than human, without mental activities or recognizable bodily shape. Ironically, the very indifference to infants caused
by the death rates seems to have led to child rearing practices that lessened
still further the child's chances to survive.4 0 Contemporary parents are thus
free to invest emotions and expectations in their children that would have
been unrealistic before, making the parent-child relationship more intense
than it had been in previous eras.
The changing economic relation between parents and children also has
implications for the psychological relationships. As Stern has shown, over
the past 100 to 150 years the economic value of children to parents has declined considerably. 4 1 Whereas in the past children were valuable economic
resources, both for their current labor and as a source of financial support
in old age, now the costs of raising children exceed the purely economic return. Yet parental emotional involvement with children has risen enormously
over the same period of time. Rather than being a practical investment,
children have come to be prized emotionally and for the symbolic value of
their present and future achievements. Some of the possible functional
connections between economic changes and changes in parental ideology
have been spelled out by Raymond Marks. 42 The point to be emphasized
here is that because of the demographic and economic changes noted above,
38.

See id. at 8. For other data on preindustrial childhood mortality rates, see POPULATION
445-48 (D. Glass & D. Eversley eds. 1965).
39. P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 38-39 (R. Baldick transl. 1962).
40. See D. HUNT, PARENTS AND CHILDREN IN HISTORY (1970); W. KESSEN, supra note 23,
at 30-31.
41. See Stern, Smith, & Doolittle, How Childrent Used to Work, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
no. 3, at 93 (1975).
42. See Marks, supra note 36, at 88-92.
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contemporary children on the whole are objects of a very different complex
of parental emotions than children in past eras.
C.

The Child in Developmental Psychology

The models of the child in psychology reflect prevailing cultural attitudes
and practices concerning children as well as the intellectual traditions of
psychology as a field. Childhood became an object of scientific inquiry in the
psychology laboratory beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, although there had been increasing concern on the part of parents,
literary figures and social reformers for about two centuries before. Darwin's
theories stimulated the rise of scientific interest in the child. It is almost
impossible to overestimate the dramatic impact of evolutionary theory on
our notions of children as well as on psychology in general. "Development"
became the guiding metaphor for theorizing about children. As Kessen puts
it, there was a "riot of parallel-drawing" between the mind of the child and
what were presumed to be earlier historical stages of the human species:4"
The irreducible contribution of Darwin to the study of children was . . .
in his assignment of scientific value to childhood. Species develop, societies
develop, man develops. From the publication of the Origin of Species to the
end of the nineteenth century, there was a riot of parallel-drawing between
animal and child, between primitive man and child, between early human
history and child. The developing human being was seen as a natural
museum of human phylogeny and history; by careful observation of the
infant and child, one could see the descent of man.

Although psychology has outgrown its historical origins, evolutionary
doctrines continue, in many subtle ways, to influence the study of the child.
Contemporary developmental psychology, like psychology in general, is
divided into two radically different ways of looking at human nature-the
mechanistic approach and the organismic approach. Both reflect, in different ways, the biological frame of reference inherited from Darwinism.
1.

The Mechanistic Approach

The mechanistic approach consists of behavior or learning theories, as
exemplified by the work of Skinner, Hull, Dollard and Miller, Bandura, and
many others.4 4 Earlier, reference was made to the intellectual ancestors of
these theories in the discussion of the empiricist or associationist philosophers
and their assumption that the child's mind was a tabula rasa. Where the
earlier versions of this pQsition attempted to analyze the contents of the
43. W. KESSEN, supra note 23, at 115.
44. For a good overview of the various behavioristic approaches to child development,
as well as other theoretical perspectives, see generally A. BALDWIN, THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT (1967). See also J. LANGER, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT (1967).
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mind into basic elements, however, current proponents have dispensed with
the concept of mind and speak only of behavior and its elementary unitsresponses. Thus, mechanistic theories do not make use of the concept of
maturation, or developmental stages, or qualitative psychological change
in the course of development. The child is shaped not by original nature,
but by the environmental contingencies to which he has been exposed, just
like any other organism. The Darwinian influence on mechanistic theories
is evident in the influence of animal psychology on the study of the child.
At first glance, one might think that mechanistic theories see little difference between adults and children since the same "laws of learning" apply
to both. In fact, however, adult and child differ as much in mechanistic
developmental theories as in any other kind. Although not qualitatively different from adults, children-along with animals-are assumed to be much
45
simpler organisms:
The animal and the child are imperfect adults for the associationist and
imperfect in a critically important way. They can be assumed to have fewer,
or more simple, units of behavior than the full man, and their apparent
simplicity my permit finding the beginning of the thread that is woven into
the inexplicably complicated pattern of adult human behavior.
2.

The Organismic Theories

Although mechanistic theories use the term "development" in a general
and descriptive sense, organismic theories use the term in a more restricted
way. They define development as a qualitative change of the whole organism
from one state or form to another. The organismic approach may be further
subdivided into psychoanalytic theories and what Langer had called "organic
lamp" theories. 46 The psychoanalytic theories include principally, besides
the work of Freud, that of Erikson.4" By organic-lamp theorists, Langer refers to the work of Piaget and Werner.4
Like psychoanalytic theories,
organic-lamp theorists assume that innate, biologically-rooted functions are
the organizing forces that govern development, although they operate in
interaction with the environment.
Although each theory selects a different aspect of the child as the key to
understanding the process of development, they all agree on several things:
1. Development is self-propelled and teleological-that is, the "push"
to change comes from within the organism, and the endpoint of development is implicit at the beginning.
45. W. KESSEN, supra note 23, at 129.
46. See J. LANGER, supra note 44, at 1-11.
47. E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963).
48. See generally J. PIAGET, SIx PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES (D. Elkind ed. 1968); J. PIAGET,
THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD (1954); J. PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE
IN CHILDREN (M. Cook transl. 1966); H. WERNER, THE COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL
DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1957).
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2. The adult is categorically, or qualitatively, different from the
child. The different stages of childhood are also qualitatively different from each other.
3. Developmental theories are organized around specific concepts
of adult competence. For Freud, the endpoint of development
is the genital, heterosexual adult, parent to children, with a
place in the occupational world. For Piaget, the endpoint of development is the stage of formal operational thinking-the ability
to think hypothetically and abstractly.
Thus, by definition, these theories set up a polar opposition between child
and adult nature. If the adult end of the scale is defined as logical and rational, then the child is, by definition, autistic, irrational, emotional, and lacking in perceptual and cognitive structures. These qualities are conceived of
as being appropriate for children.
Developmental theories claim to be universal. In Freudian theory, development is caused by changes in the body's erotic emphasis. The theory
allows for different outcomes, depending on how the child's development
crises are met; but the psychosexual basics-orality, anality, and genitalityand the Oedipal crises are held to be universal. Piaget's progressions are
based on maturation of the brain and nervous system and the child's encounters between'the physical and social environment found in all cultures.
As Langer puts it: "The environment . ..in organic lamp theory is merely
49
the occasion for or scene of, and not the cause or agent of, development.
Although both organic lamp and psychoanalytic theories fit the developmental framework or paradigm in both of the above senses, they differ in
important ways. In some ways, the Piagetian image of the child is the polar
opposite of the Freudian image. If the Freudian child is a demonic little
beast, seething with lust and aggression, Piaget's is a scientist, bubbling with
curiosity-the baby dropping toys out of his crib is revealed to be a little
Galileo, observing the behavior of falling bodies. Not only does he exhibit
a thirst for knowledge as strong as the sexual urges of the Freudian childeven stronger, because less satiable-but the Piagetian child has an active
and independent intellect. In Freud's imagery of the child, as well as that of
most socialization research, the child is a more or less passive recipient of
the demands and teachings of his culture-the only alternative to acceptance
is resistance. The choice of weaning and toilet training as the central events
in the socialization of the child are significant-these are precisely the areas
that allow no room for innovation on the part of the child. All children are
eventually weaned and toilet-trained-in these struggles the culture always
wins, and the child always conforms. The Piagetian child, however, does
49. J.

LANGER,

supra note 44, at 157.
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not merely internalize the standards of adults as he or she grows up. Piaget's
model of development credits the child with more autonomy and creativity
than any other. The child participates in its own development and is not the
passive victim of either an internal process unfolding on its own or of social
pressures.
Yet, the Piagetian child is not so unlike the Freudian one as he appears at
first glance. He is curious like a scientist, but his capacity to process information is as yet unsophisticated. His thought processes are egocentric, animistic,
and easily tricked by appearances. Show him two equal balls of clay, roll one
into a sausage, and he will tell you there is now less clay in it because it is
thinner. He has a very long way to go before he is ready to participate in
adult life.
II
LIMITATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL PARADIGM

The problem with all of the above images of the child is not so much that
they are wrong but that they are limited in a variety of ways, despite the
many valid insights they provide. The rest of this article will deal in some
detail with the limitations of developmental theories as guides both to understanding children and to formulating policies to deal with them. It will
be argued that developmental psychology has overemphasized the view of
development as an individual process unfolding from within and neglected
the influence of social and cultural contexts on children and concepts of
childhood, and that it has emphasized grand theories and laboratory tests
rather than empirical studies of children in their ordinary environments.
A.

Grand Theories and Abstracted Empiricism

One surprising limitation is that most developmental research has little
to say about children and their daily lives. As a recent review of the litera50
ture on early child care put it:
The study of human development is nowhere more highly developed
than in the United States, where hundreds of investigators monthly fill
the pages of the numerous journals and books devoted to scientific inquiry
concerning children's development. . . . But most of this research has little
to do with the process of development as it occurs in daily life.
A critique Mills once made of the field of sociology seems pertinent to
developmental psychology. He argued that most sociological work seemed
to fall into two categories-abstracted empiricism and grand theory. The
50.

H.

ROBINSON,

N. ROBINSON,

M. WOLINS, U. BRONFENBRENNER, & J. RICHMOND,
Early Child Care No. 3, 1973).

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND CARE 4 (Int'l Monographs on
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first dealt with isolated bits of information that did not reflect the real social
situations from which they were supposedly derived; the second presented
broad theoretical concepts with little relevance to actual social life. 51 Much
experimental work in child psychology would fit under the heading of "abstracted empiricism," while much developmental theory would qualify as
"grand theory." Thus, American developmental psychology, as Bronfenbrenner and others have observed, has tended to emphasize laboratory
studies in which the child performs an unfamiliar task in a strange situation
with a strange adult. It has tended to neglect the study of social settings in
52
which children live and the persons who are central to them emotionally.
As a result of the emphasis on laboratory studies, developmental psychology tends to deal with bits and pieces of the child. The rationale for
this approach is that eventually all the bits and pieces can be added together
to give a comprehensive picture. It is rare, however, for anyone to try to
construct the comprehensive picture. More often, there is a tendency for the
bits and pieces to be taken for the real things they represent. Von Bertalanffy
calls this the fallacy of the "nothing-but. 5 3 In the field of child development, the "nothing-but" fallacy takes the form of assuming that a child is
"nothing-but" the developmental stage or test performance typical of that
age. Even if the attempt were made to put the pieces together, it is doubtful that they could compose a valid and comprehensive picture of the child.
A recent review of developmental research summed up the problem this
way:

54

Most serious investigators would readily grant that on the one hand,
reality is complex, and, on the other hand, research models often impose an
unrealistic simplification. Social scientists, it is sometimes said, are forced
to look at small bits and pieces and construct from them a model of reality.
In doing this they are often forced into a kind of shorthand. The problem
is that this shorthand tends to become a substitute for reality, in interpreting
results, in reporting them, and in making recommendations based on them.

The grand developmental theories of Freud, Piaget, and Werner, although much richer in their descriptions of children and their behavior
than laboratory studies, also fail to portray children in terms of their dayto-day lives. For example, parents who have studied Freud before having
children are often surprised to find that the very young infant does not
seem to spend all his time being "oral" and that toilet-training does not
occupy most of the toddler's days. White has written of the discrepancies

51.
52.
53.

C. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 25-75 (1959).
See, e.g., Bronfenbrenner, supra note 3.
Von Bertalanffy, General System Theory and the Behavioral Sciences, in 4 DiscussioNs
ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT 155 Q. Tanner & B. Inhilder eds. 1960).
54. Herzog & Sudia, supra note 9, at 207.
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between theoretical notions of children at different ages and their actual
55
daily behavior. Even in infants, such discrepancies are striking:
Somehow, the image has gotten into our minds that the infant's time is
divided between eating and sleep. . . . [T]his is not true even for newborn
infants, who show distinct forerunners of what will later become playful
exploratory activity.
Gesell notes that at four weeks there is apt to be a waking time in the
late afternoon during which visual experience begins to be accumulated.
At 16 weeks this period may last for half an hour, and the times increase
steadily up to one year. Gesell's typical "behavior day" shows an hour of
play before breakfast, two hours before lunch, an hour's carriage ride and
another hour of social play in the afternoon, and perhaps still another hour
after being put to bed. At the age of 12 months, the child is already putting
in a six-hour day of play, not to mention the overtime that occurs during
meals and the bath.
Piaget's model of the child is as incomplete as Freud's, even though
focusing on the very things that the Freudian theories slight-the young
child's eagerness to learn, to explore, and to make sense of environment.
Piaget's work on the first two years of life is rich in detailed descriptions of
actual behavior, but the incidents are selected to illustrate the stages of intellectual growth rather than to give a rounded picture of the child and his
day's activities. After the first two years, Piaget's writings serve as an even
less useful guide to the activities and interests of children than his description of infant activities. He becomes less interested in the child's actual behavior and more concerned with the child's thinking, especially the limits of
the child's conceptual capabilities.
Baldwin points to a gap between the ordinary, everyday functioning of
preschool children and their performance on Piagetian tests of their thinking. It is surprising, he notes, that sensitive observers of children had never
56
discovered Piaget's findings before he published his research:
Nursery school teachers with years of experience find it impossible to
believe that the child thinks the number of objects changes as one spreads
them out or clusters them together. For some reason, in an experimental
situation where he must deal with the problem in terms of language and
engage in conceptual thinking about it, the child reveals weaknesses and
defects that are seldom, if ever, manifested in his overt behavior.
A similar point is made by the sociologist Denzin. He finds that the actual
behavior of children is more complex, both intellectually and socially, than
developmental theories would lead one to assume. He summarizes his find5 7
ings as follows:

55.

White, Competence and Psychosexual Stages of Development, in NEBRASKA

97, 110-11 (M. Jones ed. 1960).
A. BALDWIN, supra note 44, at 584.
Denzin, The Work of Little Children, 27 NEw
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Children's work involves such serious matters as developing languages for
communication; presenting and defending their social selves in difficult
situations; defining and processing deviance; and constructing rules of
entry and exit into emergent social groups. Children see these as serious
concerns and often make a clear distinction between their play and their
work. This fact is best grasped by entering those situations where children
are naturally thrown together and forced to take account of one another.
The argument is not that the concept of development is wrong and ought
to be abandoned. Rather, the concept should be used sparingly and critically.
Isaacs, a psychologist who studied cognitive development in preschool children, sums up her findings by noting that the overall impression one gets
from her records is that the cognitive behavior of little children, even in the
58
very early years, is not very different from that of adults:
Allowing for the immense difference in knowledge and experience, they
go about their business of understanding the world and what happens to
them in it, very much as we do ourselves....
If we stress maturation in mental growth too strongly, and treat it too
readily as literal organic fact (of the same order as the facts of embryology),
we are likely both to overemphasise [sic] the difference between children
and ourselves, and to underestimate the part played by experience in their
development.
B.

Childhood Capacities, Adult Infirmities

In the models of development discussed thus far, the adult has been
taken as the measure of the child. There is, in fact, no well defined theoretical position in psychology comparable to Dewey's philosophy concerning the distinct virtues of children 59 or to the romantic writers' view of the
child's imagination, clarity of perception, and capacity for uninhibited
joy. 60 A few psychologists, however, have objected to the prevailing view
of the child's ineptness, arguing that growing up involves losses as well as
gains. Schactel argues that becoming an adult involves a progressive impoverishment of the capacity to perceive the world, as one learns to deaden
and distort experience by translating it into the conventional patterns of
the culture: 6 '
In the course of later childhood, adolescence, and adult life, perception
and experience themselves develop increasingly into the rubber stamps of
conventional cliches. The capacity to see and feel what is there gives way
to the tendency to see and feel what one expects to see and feel, which, in
turn, is what one is expected to see and feel because everybody else does.

57 (1930).

58.

S. ISAACS, INTELLECTUAL GROWTH IN YOUNG CHILDREN

59.
60.
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See generally J. DE~WE', DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1926).
See P. COVENEY, supra note 24, at 89.
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Recently, there have been some experimental findings that tend to support the view that maturation involves the impoverishment of one's capacities along with the enhancement of them. In a series of studies of young
children's perceptual abilities, Gaines has discovered that far from being
diffuse, autistic, or unsteady in their perception, young children can perform
some perceptual tasks with astonishing accuracy, capacity, and competency.
For example, young children are exceptionally skilled in the observation of
small details and pattern changes. This skill tends to be lost to adults, except
for those who become proofreaders, color experts, bird watchers, mushroom
hunters, or scientists. It seems that learning more abstract ways of thought
usually extinguishes these perceptual skills. Gains raises the question of
whether abstract logical competence is simply incompatible with these skills
in most people or whether it would be possible to preserve the ability to make
62
fine discriminations and think abstractly at the same time.
A different line of research with similar import involves the study of the
brain. 63 In the past decade, it has been discovered that the two halves of the
brain function as two independent centers of consciousness. The left side is
primarily verbal, analytic, logical. The right, or nonspeaking, side of the
brain, which is currently the object of much research, is nonverbal, musical,
artistic, spatial, and relational. Each side of the brain has its own distinct
virtues, and ideally one should be able to alternate between the two modes of
functioning. Most people grow up relying on one hemisphere to the exclusion of the other, however, resulting in a progressive narrowing of a personality and potential. It is perhaps this loss of early capacities that led Max
64
Wertheimer to define an adult as a "deteriorated child.
The overemphasis on the differences between children and adults in
developmental psychology results from not only an underestimate of children's abilities, but an overestimate of that of adults. In fact, developmental
theories do not portray a valid picture of the everyday mental functioning
of adults. The earlier stages in Piaget's theory, for example, do describe
capacities that all children actually attain, at least in Westernized cultures.
But the final level of cognitive development-that of operational thought,
the ability to think hypothetically and abstractly-has proven much more
elusive to document in adolescents and adults.6 5 Similarly, tests of moral
62. See Gaines, Matrices and Pattern Detection by Young Children, 9 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 143 (1973).
63. See THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS (R. Ornstein ed. 1973); Pines, We Are
Left-Brained or Right-Brained, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 32; Sperry, The
Great Cerebral Commissure, 210 SCIENTIFIC AM. 42 (1964).
64. Quoted in L. LESHAN, How TO MEDITATE 4 (1974).

65.
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development based on Piaget's work do not describe the actual moral reasoning or behavior of adolescents or adults; rather, they represent an ideal
norm that most adults never reach.66
Similar observations may be made about psychoanalytic developmental
stages. In Erikson's work, for example, the childhood stages are intended to
be descriptive of the children's behavior at given ages. But the adult stages
are more normative than descriptive-they portray a type of psychological
functioning that Erikson acknowledges to be a utopian conception rarely
found among the adults of any existing culture.67 The same general point
holds for other psychoanalytic concepts: There is little evidence that adults
are entirely free from the irrationality, superstition and magical-thinking
68
that supposedly typify children.
Even those adults who attain the highest stages do not function at those
levels all the time. Inhelder, an associate of Piaget, explained at a conference
that when a person attains the highest stage of thought, it merely means that
under "optimal conditions," he or she is capable of behaving in a way that
would have been impossible earlier. To illustrate this assertion by his associate, Piaget offered himself as an example: 9
Our cognitive functions are certainly not uniform for every period of the
day. Although I am mainly engaged in intellectual operations, I am for
example at an operatory level for only a small part of the day when I devote myself to my professional work. The rest of the time I am dealing with
empirical trial and error on a very low level, as you can imagine. Every
moment I am indulging in pre-operatory intuition. At other times I go even
lower and almost give way to magical behavior. If I am stopped by a red
light when I am in a hurry it is difficult for me not to link this up with other
preoccupations of the moment. In short, the intellectual level varies considerably exactly like the affective level ....

C.

The Recapitulation Hypothesis

Part of the reason for psychology's relative neglect of children in daily
life is the emphasis in laboratory methods and the attempt to emulate the
experimental sciences. Another reason is the impact of evolutionary theory
in developmental psychology. As noted earlier, modern child study was

66.
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See Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization,
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67.

347 (D. Goslin ed. 1969).

See E. ERIKSON, supra note 47, at 266.

68. "Irrational" beliefs, such as religion, superstition, astrology, and so forth, are obviously widespread in our society. Some anthropologists have questioned whether the distinction between "religion" and "magic" is valid. See, e.g., Hammond, Magic: A Problem in Semantics,
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stimulated by the evolutionary theories of Darwin. The use of biological
models of development as lenses for viewing children can be traced to these
origins.
One of the most influential concepts to emerge from the new interest in
evolution was the recapitulation hypothesis-the notion that the development of the individual repeats the history of the species ("ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"). The starting point for the recapitulation hypothesis was
the development of embryos. Thus, it was noted that the human embryo
starts out as a single-celled organism, becomes a multicelled organism, then
resembles a fish, and so on. Extending this idea, the mental development of
the growing child was assumed to repeat the mental development of the
human race, reaching its highest point in the adult rational mind of Western
man.
Hall's work is the prime example of how Darwin's biological concepts
were translated into psychological ones (Hall is widely recognized as the
"father" of child study in America). 0 He divided child development into
stages corresponding to prehistoric eras in the development of the human
race. Thus, infancy, the first four years of life, corresponded to the animal
stage of the human species when it was still using four legs. Childhoodfrom the age of four to eight years-was supposedly a recapitulation of an
earlier cultural era of hunting and fishing. And the age of eight to twelve
years, a period Hall called "youth," was a reenactment of the "humdrum life
of savagery" before the higher human traits emerged. 7 ' Adolescence, in
Hall's scheme, represented a turbulent, transitional stage in the 2history of
7
the race, after which the highest levels of civilization were attained:
The child comes from and harks back to a remoter past; the adolescent is
neo-atavistic, and in him the later acquisitions of the race slowly become
prepotent. Development is less gradual and more saltatory, suggestive of
some ancient period of storm and stress when old moorings were broken
and a higher level attained.

Hall's ideas sound rather farfetched to modern ears-and, indeed, his
highly literal version of the recapitulation theory, based on the inheritance
of acquired characteristics, is no longer acceptable scientifically. Yet, in some
basic ways, Hall's views of human development are retained in much current
psychological theorizing. The following are some of the assumptions of reSee Grinder, The Concept of Adolescence in the Genetic Psychology of G. Stanley Hall, 40
355 (1969); McCullers, G. Stanley Hall's Conception of Mental Development
and Some Indications of Its Influence on Developmental Psychology, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1109

70.
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71. Hall's conceptions of childhood seem to have influenced the founding of the Boy
Scouts: Scouting was thought to provide a means of satisfying the various prehistoric instincts
such as hunting, fishing, and gathering. See McCullers, supra note 70, at 1111.
72. G. HALL, ADOLESCENCE xiii (1904).
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capitulation theory that correspond to those of contemporary views of development: First, psychological development consists of a succession of genetically-determined stages that are relatively independent of environmental
factors; second, each stage in the sequence is necessary for the emergence
of the next; third, there are direct parallels between child development and
cultural development; and finally, at the apex of each developmental sequence stands Western adult man. Thus, both the development of the individual and the development of the species follow a unilinear progression
from lower, simpler and more primitive functioning to higher, more complex, more advanced functioning. "Primitive" people now living are the psychological equivalents of both prehistoric man and contemporary Western
children.
Almost every major developmental theory today has been shaped by the
assumptions of recapitulation doctrine, although this is rarely acknowledged
explicitly. McCullers, however, has pointed to important parallels between
Hall's ideas and those of five eminent developmental psychologists: Freud,
Jung, Werner, Vygotsky, and Piaget. Although most of these men rejected aspects of Hall's thinking and did not consider themselves his intellectual followers, Hall was the senior psychologist of this group and had
many opportunities to influence them both directly and indirectly. As a
group, McCullers observes, these men had a surprising number of things in
common:

73

All six men were evolutionists with some grounding in biology; all were
truly

developmental

in

their

psychological

orientation;

all

found

some

parallel between racial-cultural development and the development of the
individual that was employed to help account for psychological development. All of these men . . .conceived of development as an adaptive process progressing from a primitive to more complex organization through a
series of stages or levels, determined by a continuous interplay between
the hereditarily given and environmental stimulation. In general, all saw
the highest level of organization or maturity occurring about the time of
puberty....
If this analysis of the intellectual origins of developmental theory is correct, then much is explained about current ways of thinking about children
as well as human development in general. The metaphor of development,
based on embryology, leads one to think of psychological development
as an internal process unfolding according to its own laws. It encourages a
heavy emphasis on biological maturation in developmental theory, to the
neglect of social, cultural, and historical influences. In short, child psychology assumes, as Riegel puts it, that the child grows up in a "sociocultural
74
vacuum.
73.
74.
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III
INDIVIDUAL GROWTH AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

No developmental psychologist disregards entirely the influence of the
environment or claims that development is purely a matter of biological
maturation. Both Freudians and Piagetians, for example, stress the interaction between the internal change and environment. But to emphasize a
point made earlier, the environment in these theories is the mere scene of
development-it does not cause development to happen nor determine its
nature or direction. Like the effects of soil and climate on plants, the effects
of the environment in the prevailing developmental theories are important
but limited: Growth can be stunted or speeded up, but the nature of the
organism remains the same.
Recently, some psychologists have begun to go beyond this limited view
of how individual development interacts with the social and cultural context.
Rather than look at development as a process whose outcome is somehow
inherent in the child from the beginning, they are arguing that the growth
of the individual is inextricably bound up with sociocultural conditions and
changes: 75
[T]he paradigm traditionally applied in child psychology pretends that
individuals grow up in . . . a sociocultural vacuum. Growth of the individual,
as depicted by all the tables and curves in articles and textbooks, is likely
to be a mere artifact generated by the systematic disregard of historical
changes in education, communication, welfare, etc.
Failing to recognize the interdependence of individual psychology and
the social matrix may invalidate many research results. Thus, findings may
be valid for one historical era, but not for another. Although anthropologists have for some time argued that many psychological concepts may be

"ethnocentric"-biased in favor of Western culture-it is only recently that
there has emerged an awareness of chronological bias-the possibility that
findings may be valid for one historical era but not for another. Also, some
psychologists have come to realize that individual change has often been
confounded with social and cultural change. For example, it was once regarded as well-established fact that a person's IQ inevitably declines with
aging. This has turned out to be untrue, however; the seeming age decline
was an artifact of the "cross sectional" method of comparing people of different ages to each other. There has been a tendency in the twentieth century for succeeding generations or cohorts to score better on IQ tests; thus,
at any one point in time, older adults will score lower than younger adults,
but not necessarily lower than themselves at earlier ages.
75.

Id.
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More far-reaching psychological change may be found in the psychiatric literature. Since the beginnings of psychoanalysis around the turn of
the century, psychotherapists have been observing changes in the character structures and symptomatology of the patients who appear for treatment. The pre-World War I patient differed from the patient of the 1920's
and 30's; the post-World War II patients differed from those of the 60's
and 70's.76 The most dramatic instance is the disappearance of hysteria as a
medical problem. For more than 2000 years, since the beginnings of recorded medicine in ancient Egypt medical writers and practitioners were
preoccupied with the "disease." Paradoxically, the understanding of the
disease that emerged in the twentieth century may have led to its disappearance.

77

Writing of developmental psychology in particular, Keniston described
78
the problem of "chronocentrism":
Every epoch tends to freeze its own unique experience into a historical
version of Life-in-General. Modern developmental psychology witnesses
this universal trend. Despite recent advances in our understanding of
human development, our psychological concepts have generally suffered
from a historical parochialism that takes the patterns, timetables, and sequences of development prevalent among middle-class children in contemporary Western societies as the norm of human development.

A.

The Discovery of Adolescence

Nowhere is this "chronocentrism" clearer than in the development of the

concept of adolescence. The emergence of this concept illustrates how a set
of social and cultural changes that shaped children's lives came to be interpreted as a natural process. The history of adolescence illustrates the relativity
of stages of the life cycle, the looseness of the relationship between biological
maturation and psychological development, and the interdependence of
individual experience and the social and cultural context.
The dramatic physiological changes of puberty are often said to be the
cause of adolescent psychological characteristics, such as storm and stress
emotionality. But it is important to distinguish between the physiological
changes marking sexual maturation and the changes in behavior and social
status that may or may not accompany them. Puberty is a universal occurrence, but adolescence can be viewed as a social invention of advanced technological societies. For example, in a review of theories of adolescence, Muuss
writes:7 9
76.
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The relationship between pubescence and adolescence becomes more complicated if material from cultural anthropology concerning initiation rituals
and initiation periods is considered. In some instances, the transition from
childhood to adulthood is smooth and without social recognition; in other
instances, puberty rites bring about a transition not from childhood to adolescence, but from childhood to adulthood. Pubescence seems to be the only
aspect of the process of maturation that some primitive societies recognize;
after puberty the young man and woman obtain adult status and . . . priviliges.
In earlier eras of our own society, puberty was not considered the decisively important transition it was later to become. The historian Kett argues
80
that:
The onset of male puberty failed to coincide with any fundamentally
new life experience. Boys at puberty simply were not conspicuous in the way
they later became . . . . [T]he twentieth century has argued that no matter
where the boy is, what he is doing, or what he has been through, with the
onset of puberty he becomes an adolescent. In the 1830s, in contrast, popular
definitions of youth took their cue more from social status than from physiology. If a sixteen-year-old boy were in district school, he was called a
child, and for the most part treated like one. If in college, he was usually
described as a youth. Strictly speaking, the same boy could be a child for
part of the year, and a youth for the remainder.
Historical evidence from our own culture permits us to observe adolescence in the process of being "invented." Rousseau is generally credited with
introducing the concept into Western culture. Describing adolescence as a
second birth, he was the first to describe the emotional traits that have come
to be the hallmark of adolescence-the frequent outbursts of temper, and
moodiness: "[A] perpetual stirring of the mind . . . makes the child almost
ungovernable. He becomes deaf to the voice he used to obey; .. .he is a lion
in a fever; he distrusts his keeper and refuses to be controlled."" l
Despite Rousseau's writings, however, the idea of adolescence did not
become part of everyday social reality until the dawn of the twentieth century.
Hall is generally credited with popularizing the concept. His monumental
two-volume work on adolescence 8
not only made the term a household
word, but also stimulated a vast amount of scientific investigation. Rousseau
and Hall, of course, did not invent adolescence. Rather, their work reflected
social and cultural changes that were transforming human experience. The
years between puberty and the achievement of "adulthood" were coming to
have a significance they did not possess in previous eras.
The emergence of adolescence is related to the decline of the working

80. Kett, Adolescence and Youth in Nineteenth-Century America, 2 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST.
283, 294-95 (1971).
81. Quoted in W. KESSEN, supra note 23, at 93.
82. G. HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1924).
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family as the unit of economic production. In stable agricultural societies,
where occupations are passed on from father to son, one generation quietly
merges into the next. The decline of this tradition opened up a gap between
the experience of parents and children and transformed the teenage years
into a time of occupational choice. The prolongation of education and the
removal of childhood from the labor market by means of compulsory education and child-labor laws also contributed to adolescent experience. The
age-graded school created a separate world of children and youth. Without
such peer groups, the emergence of the "teenager" and youth cultures could
not have taken place.
Thus, economic, familial, and cultural changes transformed the experience of growing up; adolescence became an important stage of the individual's biography. The opening of a gap between physical maturation and the
attainment of social adulthood led to the psychological characteristics that
have come to be known as the adolescent experience-the urge to be independent from the family; the discovery of the unique and private world of
the self; the search for an identity; and the questioning of adult values and
assumptions which may take the form of idealism, or cynicism, or both at
the same time.
There is still debate among psychologists about the precise nature of
adolescence-whether it is strictly a social phenomenon; or whether it is
based on some neurological (if not hormonal) substrate, and thus in some
sense culturally universal and "natural." Yet even those who argue for universality recognize the role of environmental stimulation and acknowledge
that the adolescent experience is not inevitable.13 Indeed, some researchers
argue that even in contemporary America, much of the population does
not experience adolescence, but goes directly from childhood into adulthood
without passing through the stage of emotional turbulence, questioning,
search for self, and so forth.

4

On the other hand, however, some observers have noted that the adolescent experience is taking longer to come to a close, and that the transition
to adulthood is becoming harder to discern. Keniston has argued that the
same factors that give rise to adolescence are now at work in later decades
of life-the extension of education through college and graduate school for
masses of the population, and rapid social changes making it hard to achieve
a settled identity occupationally or otherwise. As a result of these changes,
Keniston argues that a new stage of life, which he calls "youth," has emerged
85
between adolescence and adulthood.
83. See Kohlberg, The Child as a Moral Philosopher, 2
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B.

The Discovery of Childhood

If adolescence may be viewed as a socially constructed stage of life, is it
possible that childhood, the years between infancy and adolescence, can also
have undergone the same process of social construction? In fact, recent
historical work on the history of childhood parallels the adolescent findings.
Aries, the historian who first enunciated this thesis, writes: 86
In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to
suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of childhood is not to be confused with affection for children: it corresponds to an
awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular nature
which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult. In
medieval society this awareness was lacking. That is why, as soon as the child
could live without the constant solicitude of his mother, his nanny or his
cradle-rocker, he belonged to adult society....
The infant who was too fragile as yet to take part in the life of adults
simply "did not count" ....
Aries's work sketches the movement of the infant from a limbo outside
society to a central place in the family. But the movement of the middleaged child was from a place in the adult community to a segregated existence outside the world of adults. Aries argues that the recognition of childhood was brought about by the emergence of specific social institutionsnamely, the modern school and the bourgeois nuclear family, which created
distinct roles for children. Children came to be perceived as not yet ready
87
for life-they needed a "sort of quarantine" before joining adults:
Family and school together removed the child from adult society. The
school shut up a childhood which had hitherto been free within an increasingly severe disciplinary system. . . . The solicitude of family, Church,
moralists and administrators deprived the child of the freedom he had
hitherto enjoyed among adults. . . . But this severity was the expression of
a very different feeling from the old indifference: an obsessive love which
was to dominate society from the eighteenth century on.
Although Aries's assertions may seem startling, his thesis that premodern
Europe lacked a clearly distinguished concept of childhood was not entirely
unprecedented. Anthropologists had often made the same point for nonWestern cultures, voicing objection to the assertions of psychologists concerning universal developmental stages and the incompetence of children.8 "
Thus, Mead's studies of adolescence in Samoa had much earlier questioned
the notion of adolescence as an inevitable period of emotional crisis.8 9 And
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others have noted the absence of the supposedly "universal" latency stage
of development-the period from the age of about six years to adolescence,
which Freud has described as free of sexual drives and interests-observing
that in many cultures, genital sexual behavior is continuous from infancy
through adulthood. 9°
In fact, as Benedict has written, our culture is distinctive because of the
sharp discontinuities between the behavior demanded of the child and that
demanded of adults; children "play" and are nonresponsible, while adults
work and take responsibility; the child is supposed to be obedient, while the
adult is dominant; the child is supposed to be sexless, while the adult is supposed to be sexually active and competent. In few other cultures, Benedict
points out, do children have to learn one set of behaviors as children and
then unlearn or reverse these patterns when they grow up. 9 1
Fortes makes a similar point. In many traditional African societies, he
writes, 92
[Tihe social sphere of adult and child is unitary and undivided .... Nothing
in the universe of adult behavior is hidden from children or barred to
to them. They are actively and responsibly part of the social structure,
the economic system, the ritual and ideological system.
The major contrasts between premodern societies and our own focus on
the middle-aged child-the seven-to-twelve-year-old. In a worldwide and
historical perspective, our culture is decidedly unusual in that children of this
age are not involved in productive work. Stephens points out, for example,
that in nearly all societies, children go to work by the age of ten years, after
a period of apprenticeship: "Typically, work begins somewhere between the
ages of three and six, the load of duties and responsibilities gradually increased, and sometime between the ages of nine and fifteen the child be' 93
comes-occupationally speaking-a fully functioning adult.
Aries's description of premodern European practice is similar: 94
Generally speaking, transmission from one generation to the next was
ensured by the everyday participation of children in adult life. . . . Everyday life constantly brought together children and adults in trade and craft
.... The same was true of the army .... In short, wherever people worked,
and also wherever they amused themselves, even in taverns of ill repute,
children were mingled with adults. In this way they learnt the art of living
from everyday contact.
90. See W. STEPHENS, THE FAMILY IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 376-78 (1963); Hardy,
An Appetitional Theory of Sexual Motivation, 71 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 19 (1964).
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How can we resolve the contradiction between the "small adult" conception of childhood and the early entrance of preindustrial children into
adult life, and psychological theories proposing that a child is not ready for
participation in adult life until he has completed a series of developmental
tasks lasting into his twenties? The issue has rarely been raised explicitly,
but it is possible to discern three general approaches to an answer.
The first approach might be called "psychological universalism." Some
psychologists assume that development universally runs its course whether
or not children wear adult clothes and take part in adult life. The second
interpretation might be called an "arrested development" approach. It
assumes that while the sequence of development is the same everywhere,
the different stages may be reached later or not at all under some circumstances. As noted earlier, most developmental theories look on the "primitive" adult as psychologically comparable to the Western child. Thus, a child
in a primitive society would not have as far to go as the child in an advanced
society in order to be fully developed.
The basic flaw in the arrested development model lies in its choice of the
endpoint of development-or more precisely, its failure to observe that a
choice is being made at all.9 5 The researcher who wishes to study development must choose some conception of adult competence as an endpoint towards which the child will develop. Developmental theories take the modern,
Western-educated adult as the norm of development. Observations of the
child are then organized around this concept of competence. As one critic
96
argues, such an approach is a
[G]randoise, ethnocentric conception that regards the post-Renaissance
ways of thinking of Western man, and more particularly the mathematicalphysical scientific modes of apprehending and interpreting reality, as the
self-evident norm for cognitive development. It elevates one possibility of
human nature into the grand design, the secret intent, of biologically given
numan nature.
The third approach might be called "cognitive pluralism." Rather than
regard the course of development in middle class Western children as the
unfolding of a "basic human potential" that is everywhere the same, or as
the internalization of the only valid forms of knowledge, development can
be viewed as the emergence of particular sets of adaptive skills that are geared
to particular social and environmental circumstances.
If nonliterate peoples are not intellectually retarded, we cannot conclude
that their failure to recognize childhood as a separate state of life leads to
developmental "arrest." But it would be wrong to equate premodern Europe
95.
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with contemporary "underdeveloped" societies. Economically, politically,
and culturally, medieval society was more "developed" than contemporary
preliterate cultures. Furthermore, the bulk of the historical data pertains
to the upper social classes of the times-people most advanced in such
matters as literacy. Thus, the patterns described by Aries and other historians
represent an important test case for developmental psychology: The concept of childhood as we know it may not have existed, but the adult forms
of competence were similar to our own. The evidence points to the conclusion that under such conditions, children become competent at earlier ages.
Children in preindustrial Europe not only performed such craft occupations as farming, baking, and shoemaking; they could also be apprenticed
to lawyers, merchants, pharmacists, administrators, and, of course, the
Church. The strongest evidence against equating the absence of childhood
with developmental arrest is the evidence of precocity in premodern Europe.
Children could not only enter apprenticeships young, but could also enter
and complete college at the age of nine or ten years, and complete their
studies at the age of thirteen years. Aries notes that up until a certain time,
"[w]hether this [precocity] was the result of talent, as in the case of Descartes,
or of forcing . . . precocity implied a superiority which opened the way to a

great career."9 Only later did the idea appear that there was something not
quite right about doing adult things or older child things before one was
"ready."

C. Developmental Stages Revisited: The Great
Transformation at the Age of Five-to-Seven Years
At this point, the reader may be wondering whether there is anything left
at all of the concept of development. In this section, it will be argued that
the concept is useful if used carefully, and the hypothesis will be advanced
that there are two major psychological stages of development, infancy, and
postinfancy, during which time the child comes into possession of essentially
adult-like mental capacities. Developmental theories may have wrongly
designed their staircases of growth by making the upper steps as steep as
the bottom ones. The historical studies raise the question of whether it is
useful and valid to consider the changes from childhood to adolescence and
those from adolescence to adulthood as fully comparable to the change from
infancy to childhood.
The historians, as noted earlier, report a transition in the child's social
status between the ages of five and seven years. This is often the period at
which adult work responsibilities are assumed in primitive societies; it is the
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age of first communion in the Catholic Church, and it used to be the age of
legal responsibility for crime in the common law. Within psychology also,
there is evidence that this age is a major transition point, although it is usually
assumed that this is the age at which the child becomes ready for school
rather than, as in other periods and cultures, ready for participation in adult
life.
Thus, Baldwin in his survey of the major theories of child development,
concludes that despite their differences, there is a consensus among the
theories that there are two main types of psychological functioning. The first
is primitive, direct, impulsive, and noncognitive-or primary-process; the
second is more controlled, thoughtful, and logical-or secondary-process.
One is essentially child-like; the other, adult-like. 98 Baldwin does not specify
the age at which the transition from one type of functioning to the other
occurs, but there is remarkable consensus on this point also.
Not too long ago, White, a psychologist, published a general paper on the
theme of the significance of the five-to-seven-year-old period. He was intrigued by the fact that different types of learning experiments revealed a
marked change in children's performance between the ages of five and seven
years, so he looked for more evidence of such shifts. He lists twenty-one
behavior changes from the ages of five to seven years gleaned from his survey
of the research literature. Perhaps the most striking single item in this list
is the finding that the adult IQ can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy at this age. Other changes include the following: The child is becoming
more abstract and symbolic, less concrete; he is responding to stimuli less in
terms of physical properties and more in terms of the way they are categorized in terms of language; he is learning to string together images of the
past and of the future, and so plan out behavior in advance; and he is learning to locate himself in space, gaining knowledge of left and right and memory of where things are in relation to each other. In practical terms, this last
means the child can get from one place to another and back again without
getting lost. 99
At a more general level, theoretical treatments of child development also
describe the five-to-seven-year-old period as a major turning point. For
Piaget, this age represents a fransitional period between major epochs of
thought. For the Russian developmental theorists Vygotsky and Luria, this
is the decisive turning point in behavior. Soviet researchers after Pavlov
emphasize language (the second signal system) as the basis for higher human
thought. They explain the changes at the age of five to seven years as resulting from the interiorization of speech; speech becomes the vehicle of
98.
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thought and the regulator of behavior. 10 0 For Freud, the age of five to seven
years is a time when infantile sexual impulses are repressed and parental
prohibitions are internalized to form the superego. Finally, for learning
theory this is a time when the child's responses to stimuli come to be guided
by a mediating response that he makes to the stimulus rather than the stimulus itself.
White concludes that "[p]erhaps the 5-7 period is a time when some
maturational development, combining perhaps with influences in the . . .
environment, inhibits a broad spectrum of first-level function in favor of a
new, higher level of function."''1 1 In his model of learning processes, there
emerges a picture of human development that is fully compatible with the
premodern life style as portrayed by the historians. Both suggest that there
is essentially one step up from the childhood to the adult level and that the
transition takes place at around the age of five to seven years. The conception of two major stages of thought does not imply that there are no important changes before or after this major watershed. Particularly during infancy, important developmental changes occur-for example, the toddler's
learning how to talk. But the model does suggest that changes occurring
after the age of five to seven years are not as momentous and, further, the
basis of development changes. Before the age of five to seven years, maturation plays a major role in developmental change; afterwards, learning and
culture become major forces influencing psychological development. Since,
as noted earlier, psychologists typically do not study the effects of the enduring environments in which children live, they have overlooked the possibility that schooling may have a profound effect on psychological development. Actually, the fact that virtually all normal children in America and
Europe go to school between the ages of five and seven years poses a major
0 2
theoretical challenge to contemporary psychological theory.
D.

School and Society as Developmental Contexts

The institution of schooling in Western societies has had profound effects on conceptions of childhood as well as on children themselves. It is
school, along with the family, that defines the child's place in contemporary
Western culture. For us school is the "natural habitat" of childhood, the
school child is the child. The concept of childhood, the emergence of the
private, emotionally intense family, and the idea of the school as part of the
"normal" socialization of the child were different aspects of the historical
process of modernization.
100.
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Besides their social effects in creating a separate world of childhood,
schools may have profound consequences for the thought processes of the
individual. There is a good deal of evidence showing that many of the psychological changes once thought to represent the unfolding of the innate
capacities of' the human mind may actually be the result of literacy and the
experience of going to school. For example, schooling has dramatic effects
on cognitive development in nonindustrial cultures. Tribal children or adults
with a few years of schooling think and carry out intellectual tasks more like
103
American school children than their own unschooled brothers and sisters.
All societies educate their children, but those without formal schools do
so in the course of everyday adult activities, in which, as noted earlier, the
children take part according to their abilities. There are no separate educational activities. In this type of learning-or "informal education," as the
anthropologists call it 0 4-the child learns by looking and doing, rather than
by verbal instruction. In school, he learns abstract concepts without any
immediate functional use. Even the attempts to make school education more
real or interesting for the children still proceed at a high level of conceptualization and abstraction. Thus, the school environment and the demands it
makes on the child push cognitive development in a particular direction: 10 5
[M]any modes of thinking-categorizing, inferring, abstracting, grouping
and ordering arrays of information-that we associate with a certain age of
child and use as an index of the intelligence or cognitive level of the child
may in fact be heavily dependent on Western-type schooling.
• . . It seems likely that without the specific contribution of the Western
type school ....

the whole direction of the children's cognitive development

would be different.
In our own and other advanced industrial societies, school does not introduce new ways of thought that are discontinuous with daily life outside
school. Rather it extends and elaborates ways of thinking that pervade the
society at large, particularly in the middle classes. Sociologists agree that
modernization is not merely an economic or technological change, but involves profound social and psychological changes also. It changes all aspects
of life-physical environment, the types of communities people live in, the
way they view the world, the way they organize their daily lives, and the
emotional quality of family relationships, down to the most private aspects
of individual psychological experience. Thus, children growing up in modern
societies face a radically different set of demands from children growing up
103. See Greenfield, On Culture and Conservation, in STUDIES IN COGNITIVE GROWTH 225-56
(J Bruner, R. Olver, & P. Greenfield eds. 1966).
104. See Scribner & Cole, Cognitive Consequences of Formal and Informal Education, 9 ScI. J.
553 (1973).
105. W. SCHMIDT, supra note 96, at 145-46.
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in more traditional societies. These demands, rather than the inherent psychological differences between children and adults, may account for the gulf
that seems to separate children and adults in modern societies.

IV
THE FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD

A.

The Child's Changing Place

In recent centuries of Western history, there have been profound changes
in the social place of children and in theories of childhood. New stages of
life have been added to the life cycle. The child's future at birth has changed
from one of almost certain death to one of almost unlimited possibility. In
the eyes of parents, the growth and development of the child has shifted
from being the object of mild concern or indifference to the major emotional
focus of the family. Although the claim that this is a child centered society is
ironically belied by the statistics on infant mortality, the number of children
in poverty, and so forth, the phrase does convey something of the anxieties
about children prevalent in our culture today. In view of the depth and extent of these changes, it would seem unreasonable to assume that our present
conceptions of childhood will remain in force indefinitely. If the nature of
childhood and of human development have changed in the past, they are
capable of changing again. Although it is difficult to predict the next directions of social change, a new view of childhood may be visible on the horizon.
And new stages of development may emerge from these changes.
There is evidence that contemporary social changes are altering the child's
place, both inside the family and in society at large. In a variety of ways the
norms of conventional age grading appear to be losing their previous deci-

sive influence. Although the adult world is still sharply marked off from the
world of the child, there is a certain blurring around the edges. "Adolescence" is spreading at both ends-younger children are absorbing teenage
culture and attitudes, and many of those in their twenties and beyond are
refusing to progress to "adulthood." Some of the indicators of separate status
used by Aries, such as dress and amusements, no longer distinguish children

and adults as sharply as they once did. Current clothing styles are not only
unisex, they are increasingly uniage. Where fairy tales once were shared by
all age groups, now television is.
The future of schooling as the child's place-and hence definitions of
childhood itself-are being changed by the current crisis surrounding education. As noted earlier, schools helped to invent childhood by creating places
and roles for children. Educational change now in prospect seems to be in
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06
the process of unmaking such places. We live in an "information rich"'
society, in which children at young ages begin to have large amounts of
vicarious experience through radio, television, and other media. Coleman
argues that the present educational system was designed for societies that
were "information poor," in which a child obtained most of what he knew
from direct experience, supplemented by reading, and the schools were the
community's gateway to information. Now, television has altered the ratio
between direct and vicarious experience for everyone, but especially for
children. Long before he enters a schoolroom, the young child has acquired
an enormous amount of knowledge about the world, unlike the child in past
ages who, on entering school, would have the adventure of discovering many
simple but exciting facts. Coleman cites the example of a man born in 1870
who wrote in his autobiography of his amazement at hearing in school of a
train that could go sixty miles an hour. Thus, children may have outgrown

the schools.

10 7

On the other hand, however, more and more adults want and need to
continue their learning over their lifespan. Some have suggested that the
schools should be opened to people of all ages and that children should be
integrated into work activities. The distinction between economic and educational institutions would become blurred. Schools might become communities in which children would carry out responsible service activities, but also
would include time for learning. The White House Conference on Children
suggested something like a revival of the apprentice system: workplaces
would be modified to include the young in productive work; they would
divide their time between learning and actual work. 08 The life cycle would
no longer consist of an early period of full-time school and full-time work
later, but rather a combination of the two activities over many years.
In short, the traditional notion that work is "bad" for children and separation of the adult world is "good" is being reexamined. The exploitation
of children in the mines and mills of the last century may have blinded us to
the fact that responsible and productive action may reward the child and aid
in his development. A series of studies by Engel and her associates has produced findings that challenge the prevailing assumptions about child work.
These researchers have found that child work-defined as working parttime for strangers for pay-is much more prevalent among fourth-to-eighthgrade boys than is generally believed. (The study did not include girls.) Nor
did they find that only boys from the poorest homes worked: child work was
most prevalent in the lower-middle and middle-class groups. As for the psy-
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chological effects of working, these researchers have found that having a
part-time job not only was not harmful, but also could actually aid in the
development of competence and personality-indeed, the prolonged uselessness of children today may be demoralizing and even debilitating.' 0 9
The problem of amusing children and keeping them occupied looms large
in many middle-class households; and schools have assumed a baby-sitting
function:" 10
As affluence has increased, the child's environment has become impoverished in opportunities for responsible and productive action, or any action
that tests and develops him. He is not needed at home, and there is little
place for him there during the day. . . . Some upper-middle-class suburban
school districts run a full summer program to occupy children. Schools in
Beverly Hills are in full swing in July.
B.

Redefining Adulthood

Besides changes in school and work, the situation of children is being
affected by changes in adult life. During the nineteenth century, adolescence became added to childhood as a "second childhood" to meet certain
changes in the urban industrial society of that period. Now, as we enter the
postindustrial era, it appears that a third childhood has been added to the
other two. Just as primary school and then high school have spread from the
elite to broader segments of the population, so did higher education expand
on a mass scale in the postwar era in the advanced countries. By the beginning of the 1970's, a majority of high school graduates were entering college.
Keniston has argued that this dramatic increase in higher education has
created a new stage of the lifespan-"youth"--on a mass scale:'.'
Today, in more developed nations, we are beginning to witness the rec-

ognition of still another stage of life. Like childhood and adolescence it
was initially granted only to a small minority but is now being rapidly extended to an ever-larger group. I will call this stage "youth" and by that I
mean both a further phase of disengagement from society and the period of
psychological development that intervenes between adolescence and adulthood. This stage, which continues into the twenties and sometimes into the
thirties, provided opportunities for intellectual, emotional and moral development that were never afforded to any other large group in history.
Keniston's stage of youth resembles what Lifton has called the "protean"
life style. It used to be that socialization resulted in a finished product-a person whose character was set by the end of adolescence and who would change
only under the most extreme conditions, such as a religious conversion.
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Lifton argues not only that we live in an age of identity crises that may last a
lifetime, but that settled identities may change to other settled identities,
and more than once. Thus, the conditions of life in the twentieth century
have produced a new kind of individual, whom Lifton calls "protean man,"
1 2
after the mythological figure who could take the form of any living thing.'
The concept of the protean style suggests that we may now be witnessing
not so much the invention of a new stage of life as the demise of an old oneadulthood. The tensions between self and society that Keniston posits as
being at the core of youth need not, as he seems to assume, result in a stable
resolution. Rather, the values of "youth" may persist over the lifespansuch values as openness to experience and change, cultivating one's own
individual selfhood, and the exploration of inner sensibilities.
Adulthood in the old sense was attained when a person's growth and
learning had been finished, his place in and relation to society set. The conception of childhood as a stage of life exists as a contrast to the idea of adulthood. In the postindustrial era, it seems likely that the institutional and psychological basis for conceiving childhood and adulthood as distinct stages of
life may no longer exist. Conceptions of the stages of life may resemble those
of the medieval era more than the industrial age, in that after "infancy"-the
years from birth to age seven-adults and children will not be seen as so
sharply different from each other. Yet, the postindustrial child, unlike the
medieval or the tribal child, will not be seen simply as a smaller version of the
parent, heir to the parent's place in society, and subject to parental authority
until the death of the parent.
Berger's research into communal child rearing suggests a third model of
childhood, one that may point the way to future patterns of the larger society.
Having rejected middle-class notions of maturity, he notes, communards
have to "rethink the definitions of childhood, adulthood, and the relations
11 3
between them." He continues:
Like the big "kids" who are their parents, communal children seem to be just
littler kids, less skilled, less experienced, and only perhaps less wise.
. . "Young
. people" are regarded as independent of the family, but not
as members of an autonomous category of "children"; instead, their status
is likely to be ascribed as that of "person," a development which can be
understood as part of an equalitarian ethos, as complementary to parallel
developments in the status of females, from "women" (or even "mothers") to
"people", and in the status of men, from being characterized to invidious
status terms to being characterized as, above all, "human being"....
Berger observed a transition from infancy to "person" status after the age
of four to seven years, as in Aries's description of medieval times. When
112. See Lifton, Protean Man, YALE ALUMNI REv., Jan. 1969, at 14.
113. B. Berger, B. Hackett, & R. Miller, Childrearing Practices in the Communal Family,
1972 (unpublished progress report to NIMH).
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children grow past physical dependence on adults, they are treated and tend
to behave as just another member of the extended family. He believes that
the single most important belief governing adult-child relations in the communes is that the behavior of the children does not reflect on the parents in
any way. Adults are not characterized by what they do or do not do with or to
their children, or how their children turn out.
Such adult-child relations may well become the future pattern in the larger
society. This development would not depend on everyone's joining a rural
commune. Rather, such an outcome seems implicit in a variety of trends now
going on in society at large. First, the prevailing conceptions of childhood
and adulthood impose burdens on children and parents alike. The role of
the incompetent, dependent, subordinate child-whether at home or at
school-has become increasingly burdensome to adolescents as well as to
younger children. Today, the counterculture of adolescents and youth provides a powerful socializing influence on younger children, as evidenced

in part by the extension of the youth cultural styles of music, dress, and even
protest into the lower school grades. Further, the prescriptions for child rearing that have prevailed in the middle classes impose heavy burdens on parents. These prescriptions demand that the parent-particularly the mother
-provide intellectual stimulation, emotional self-fulfillment, and autonomy
for the child. If, however, parents also wish such things for themselves,
they find themselves in conflict with the desire to provide them for the
'
child. 14
Moreover, if the ideology of women's liberation and personal fulfillment for both parents spreads among the middle classes, as it seems likely
to do, then we may find that the child's "place" in the family has changed.
CONCLUSION: PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
AND SOCIAL POLICY

Rather than suggesting specific policies to be followed, this article has
attempted to expose many of the assumptions underlying current social and
legal policies with regard to children, some of which follow:
1. That it is reasonable to classify all persons under the ages of
eighteen or twenty-one years as minors.
2. That children and adolescents are inherently incompetent and
dependent, owing to biological immaturity.

3. That children and adolescents are more like infants in their needs
and capacities than they are like adults.
4. That children's welfare is best served by separating children from
adult concerns, interests, activities, and institutions.
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By exposing these assumptions and the limitations of the developmental
paradigm, this article may be relevant to legal arguments concerning the
abolition, modification, or limitation of the status of minority, particularly
where this status is based on an unexamined presumption of children's incompetency.

15

It also lends support to the argument made by Forum 15 of

the White House Conference on Children, among others, that child-labor
laws ought to be revised to permit children "to become acquainted with the
11 6
world of work and to participate in informal apprenticeship experiences." ,
Such work involvements would also entail changes in current conceptions of
school curricula and compulsory-education laws.
But translating the general themes of this article and even the policies
described above into pragmatic action is apt to be problematic in many ways.
Although, for example, this article argues that the incompetence and dependency of children may be largely a product of cultural belief and practice, rather than an inherent condition, this is not to say they are unreal. The
existing social and economic context places limits on the exercise of children's competence and responsibility. Children do have further to go to
achieve adult levels of competence in "advanced" technological societies
than they do in small, subsistence-level ones. Their economic dependency
arises out of their inability to play productive roles in an advanced economy.
Similarly, although the discontinuity between children and adults in
sexual matters is also culturally based, this does not mean that current family
structures could accommodate unrepressed child sexuality. Nor is it likely
that the majority of families would be willing or psychologically able to provide or tolerate a genuinely egalitarian relationship with children as long as
children are economic dependents and parents remain responsible for their
children legally, morally, and, above all, emotionally. The following review
by a psychologist of two recent books advocating "children's liberation" prob17
ably reflects the sentiments of the majority of adults today:
The duties of parenthood have become increasingly onerous as the rewards, extrinsic and intrinsic, of rearing children one by one disappear.
Social approval for bearing children is being withdrawn as a consequence
of the population explosion. Parents can no longer expect in their later
years reciprocation of the support, emotional and physical, which they provide to their children. Parents are deprived even of the symbolic immortality
conferred by generational continuity in values and life style. In the unlikely
event that the Farson-Holt thrust for Children's Rights were to succeed, we
should at least have solved the problem of overpopulation. Emancipated
from birth, with all of the privileges but none of the responsibilities of adulthood, what sane "child" would ever exchange his status for that of a

parent?
115. See Rodham, supra note 15.
116. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, supra note 14, at 249.
117. D. Baumrind, Children's Rights-Adult R-sponsibilities, 1974 (unpublished book review
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Finally, it is important to remind outselves that the history of social reform contains many examples of reforms whose consequences were not anticipated by their proponents. Policies concerning children seem particularly
prone to such unanticipated consequences, the leading example being the
juvenile court. Thus, although there may be sound psychological reasons for
believing, for example, that participation in productive work would be good
for children, there is the danger that changes in child-labor and compulsory-education laws might result instead in the exploitation of children who
are now being protected by current laws. In short, although psychological
analysis should not be disregarded in the formulation of legal and social decisions, it cannot alone provide blueprints for policy.

